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Corporate Power in the Public Eye: Reassessing the 
Implications of Berle’s Public Consensus Theory 
Marc T. Moore and Antoine Rebérioux† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Adolf A. Berle, Jr. is widely regarded as the intellectual pioneer of 
corporate governance. Amongst Berle’s numerous legacies is the con-
temporary status of corporate governance as a distinct, multi-disciplinary 
field of academic inquiry.  The seminal text which he co-authored with 
Gardiner Means in 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(TMC),1 is still recognized by many scholars as the most influential con-
ceptual account of the area of social science we today refer to as corpo-
rate governance.  On a descriptive level, Berle2 is credited with identify-
ing the separation of ownership and control within public companies that 
is a consequence of widely held stock ownership.  Furthermore, in view 
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 1. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968) (1932) [hereinafter TMC]. 
 2. In our discussion of TMC in this article, we refer to the ideas and conclusions presented in 
the book as those of Berle individually.  This is partly for the purpose of authorial convenience, and 
partly also in acknowledgement of the fact that Berle has been individually accredited with expound-
ing the bulk of the work’s doctrinal and normative arguments.  This is not to deny, however, the 
invaluable empirical insights provided by Gardiner Means into prevailing ownership structures in 
US corporations, without which Berle’s propositions would almost certainly have been impossible. 
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of his famous 1932 exchange with contemporary E. Merrick Dodd in the 
Harvard Law Review journal,3 Berle became known as the original de-
fender of the shareholder wealth maximization norm in corporate gov-
ernance.  This is the principle that directors (and, indirectly, officers) 
should exercise their discretion exclusively in the collective interest of 
the firm’s equity holders, as measured by share price and underpinned by 
the fiduciary concept in corporate law.4  In response to Dodd’s apparent-
ly enlightened exhortation that managers should have “some degree of 
legal freedom” to depart from their perceived responsibility to promote 
the shareholder interest exclusively,5 Berle famously affirmed corporate 
law’s normative orthodoxy with this warning: 
[Y]ou can not abandon emphasis on ‘the view that business corpo-
rations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stock-
holders’ until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and rea-
sonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.6 
As a result of his perceived position on the above issues, Berle is 
frequently regarded to be the original intellectual precursor of the 
“agency costs” paradigm of corporate governance that attained promi-
nence within corporate law and finance scholarship from the 1970s on-
wards.7  This is in spite of the fact that many of the normative ideas ad-
                                                 
 3. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365 (1932) [hereinafter FWCMAT); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Manag-
ers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).  On this debate, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and “The Modern Corporation,” 
34 J. CORP. L. 99, 122–35 (2008); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibili-
ty: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century,  51 KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002). 
 4. For a more detailed academic exposition of this principle, including an explanation of the 
difference between the dual tenets of “shareholder wealth maximization” and “shareholder primacy” 
(on which, see infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text), see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003), especially 
Part III.  Note that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is also distinct from the (more limited) 
concept of “shareholder democracy,” on which see infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 5. Dodd, supra note 3, at 1161. 
 6. FWCMAT, supra note 3, at 1367. 
 7. The “agency costs” paradigm of corporate governance scholarship essentially distills the 
subject down to a problem of aligning the conflicting incentive patterns of different corporate partic-
ipants.  On this basis, its proponents suggest a collection of both market-based and contingent legal-
institutional devices (for example, the hostile takeover mechanism and independent boards of direc-
tors), which together have the effect of mitigating the tendency of managerial “agents” to appropri-
ate or otherwise diminish the wealth of their shareholder “principals.”  The formal autonomy and 
independent personhood of the corporation in law, and also the quasi-public decision-making power 
which large corporate enterprises are commonly alleged to exercise within society, are both elided 
by reference to the fundamentally private bargaining dynamics involved in the formation and inter-
nal constitution of companies.  At the same time, the logic of the agency costs approach leads in 
general to an acceptance of equity holders as the sole legitimate claimant to residual profit and go-
vernance rights under corporate law, in view of their unique status as superior economic risk-bearers 
amongst the general set of “inputs” constituting the business firm.  Hence, agency costs approaches 
2010] Corporate Power in the Public Eye 1111 
vanced by Berle, both in TMC itself and in his (more normatively devel-
oped) future writing, appear to run starkly against the grain of many of 
the fundamental tenets of this later school of thought.  Therefore in 
studying Berle’s work through a contemporary lens, it is customary to 
view Berle as having ideologically changed course over his scholarly 
career, from his initial position as a conservative shareholder wealth 
maximization advocate to his later position as a reformist communitarian 
theorist.8  Orthodox interpretations of Berleian theory would suggest that 
the allegedly “conservative” dimension of Berle’s thinking is character-
ized by the majority of his earlier inter-war work, principally the doc-
trinal (middle) chapters of TMC (1932),9 Berle’s contemporaneous article 
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note (1932) 
(“FWCMAT”),10  and his formative doctrinal article on corporate law 
entitled Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust (1931).11  The more “re-
formist” dimension of Berle’s scholarship, on the other hand, is felt to be 
exemplified by the concluding book of TMC (titled “Reorientation of 
Enterprise”) along with Berle’s later post-war works The 20th Century 
Capitalist Revolution (1954),12  Power Without Property (1959),13  and 
The American Economic Republic (1963).14 
                                                                                                             
to corporate governance tend to provide ideological support for the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm in corporate law, not as a moral-proprietary imperative but rather as a functional precondition 
for engendering efficient and socially beneficial outcomes from a corporation’s productive and 
wealth-generating activities (for more on this, see infra note 94–95 and accompanying text).  The 
path-breaking articles in the construction of the agency costs approach are: Michael C. Jensen & 
William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 
J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); and Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983).  For an influential application of the agency costs paradigm in 
rationalizing the structure and rules of corporate law, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, (Harvard, Cambridge, MA paperback 
ed. 1996) (1991); BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 
(1998) (dealing with the US and UK systems of corporate law respectively).  For a critical perspec-
tive on the conceptual relevance of agency costs theory to US corporate governance and law today, 
see Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebérioux, From Minimization to Exploitation: Re-Conceptualizing 
the Corporate Governance Problem (Reflexive Governance in the Public Interest, Working Paper 
No. REFGOV-CG-32), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324127. 
 8. For analysis stressing the ambiguity or duality of TMC and Berle’s thinking, see, for exam-
ple, Bratton & Wachter, supra note 3; J.A.C. Hetherington, Redefining the Task of Corporation Law, 
19 U.S.F. L. REV. 229 (1985); Allan C. Hutchinson, Public Policy and Private Cupidity: Berle and 
Means Re-Visioned 3 (CLPE Research Paper No. 3/2007), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=961292. 
 9. TMC, supra note 1. 
 10. See FWCMAT, supra note 3. 
 11. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). 
 12. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954). 
 13. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1959) [hereinafter PWP]. 
 14. ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC (1963) [hereinafter AER]. 
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The convenience of interpreting Berle in this way is that it allows 
the reader to link the majority of Berle’s earlier thinking on corporate 
governance to the later agency costs paradigm,15 while at the same time 
compartmentalizing those aspects of his (mainly later) work that do not 
support this purported connection.  In this way, the more radical, com-
munitarian strand of Berle’s normative thought can be regarded mainly 
as the historically-specific product of America’s peculiar postwar poli-
tico-economic climate,16 thus meriting it being analyzed in distinction 
from Berle’s more “mainstream” positive insights into the structure of 
American public companies.  Thus, Berle’s prescriptive ideas regarding 
re-appraisal of the rightful beneficiaries of the corporate wealth-creation 
process have now fallen by the intellectual wayside.  However, his pri-
marily descriptive insights revealed in TMC about the structure of the 
dual ownership and control relation in public companies have undoub-
tedly retained considerable influence over the ensuing decades.17 
This article takes issue with such bipolar understandings of Berle’s 
work—the various strands of which we believe are too tightly interlinked 
to be separated into constituent positive and normative elements.  In par-
ticular, we argue that, on a normative level, TMC is most appropriately 
viewed not as a sui generis project, but rather as one (early) part of a 
wider continuum of ideas advanced by Berle over the course of the fol-
lowing three decades.  By reading TMC in this contextual sense, it be-
comes possible to regard it as one aspect of a wider lifelong inquiry by 
Berle into the whole panoply of civil society pressures shaping the 
course of corporate-managerial decision-making, as opposed to a primar-
ily empirical or doctrinal study into corporate law and ownership struc-
tures whose core descriptive conclusions can be extrapolated from the 
above and viewed in their own terms.  Accordingly, TMC’s more radical 
normative propositions, especially those in the final chapter of the work, 
assume a more dynamic and time-robust character. 
We accordingly present one such contextual and integral under-
standing of Berle’s ideas; we aim at both highlighting and analyzing this 
wider institutional quality of his corporate governance scholarship.  For 
this purpose, we rely principally on the two Berleian texts which are 
most heavily associated with his work on corporate governance; namely, 
TMC (1932) itself (notably including Berle’s 1968 updates to the original 
                                                 
 15. On this, see supra note 7. 
 16. For an analysis of the peculiarity (at least by contemporary standards) of the corporatist 
politico-economic context in which Berle’s ideas were developed, see Bratton & Wachter, supra 
note 3. 
 17. See, e.g., the foundational references to Berle and Means in the seminal agency costs litera-
ture cited at supra note 7. 
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version)18 and Power Without Property (1959).19  Furthermore, we ana-
lyze Berle’s overall corporate governance project in accordance with 
what we see as its four core sub-themes: 
A. the limitations of external market forces as a constraint on mana-
gerial decision-making power; 
B. the desirability of internal (corporate) over external (market) ac-
tors in allocating corporate capital; 
C. civil society and the public consensus as a continuous informal 
check on managerial decision-making power; and 
D. shareholder democracy (as opposed to shareholder primacy or 
shareholder wealth maximization)20 as a socially instrumental insti-
tution. 
In Part II of this article, we seek to debunk the popular misconcep-
tion that Berle’s early work was a defense of the orthodox shareholder 
primacy paradigm of corporate governance.  This prefaces our analysis 
in Part III, where we set out and, in turn, examine each of the above four 
sub-themes of Berle’s overall thinking on corporate governance.  A re-
curring theme in this part of our discussion is the over-simplicity of at-
tempting to connect Berle’s thinking to the later agency costs paradigm 
of corporate governance, which we believe fails to reflect the normative 
and institutional richness of Berle’s overall social-scientific project.  In 
Part IV, we build on these insights by assessing the effects of our re-
interpretation of Berle’s work on contemporary corporate governance 
debates.  We suggest here that Berle’s lifetime work on corporate gover-
nance, when considered in an integral and non-selective way, provides 
the basis for a realistic and dynamic understanding of the concept of 
shareholder democracy and its relationship with wider civil society 
processes of public and political opinion formation. 
II.  DEBUNKING A POPULAR MYTH ABOUT BERLE 
To anyone familiar with Berle’s doctrinal analysis in the middle 
chapters of TMC, depiction of him as the forefather of the agency costs 
paradigm of corporate governance is not entirely without reasonable ba-
sis.  In this part of his great work with Means, Berle advanced the fol-
lowing (arguably questionable) positive thesis: 
                                                 
 18. See TMC, supra note 1. 
 19. See PWP, supra note 13. 
 20. On the distinction between these terms, see supra note 4 and accompanying text; infra 
notes 94–95, 104 and accompanying text. 
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[A]ll powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a 
corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived 
from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times exer-
cisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their in-
terest appears.21 
Berle consequently posited his “trusteeship” model of corporate law, 
which denoted that the legitimacy of any corporate act must be assessed, 
not only by the technical rules of law pertaining to that conduct, but also 
by a modified22 version of the equitable rules that apply to a trustee’s 
powers to administer property vested in them as a fiduciary for the trust’s 
beneficiary.23  Certainly, a selective reading of the above excerpt, viewed 
alongside Berle’s contemporaneous FWCMAT piece, 24  provides see-
                                                 
 21. TMC, supra note 1, at 220; see also Berle Jr., supra note 11. 
 22. In particular, Berle claimed that it was necessary to adapt the basic laws of trusteeship so as 
to render them less rigorous and therefore more responsive to the wide ambit of flexibility necessari-
ly involved in business decision-making.  See TMC, supra note 1, at 242. 
 23. Berle’s purported trusteeship principle is fundamentally similar to the contemporary share-
holder wealth maximization norm, albeit with one significant difference.  Whereas the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm requires simply that a director exercise his official discretion in a manner 
that is broadly calculated to enhance the market value of the equity holder’s residual claim against 
the company, the trusteeship principle goes further by asserting that a director must not use any 
statutory or constitutional powers vested in him except in accordance with the purpose for which 
they were granted (i.e., to promote the collective interest of shareholders within the legitimate 
bounds of the company’s constitutional structure) and not for any extraneous motive.  Although 
these two principles are largely consistent with one another insofar as their practical implications for 
directors are concerned, it would appear that they can potentially dictate different courses of action 
in a situation where a company is subject to a takeover bid by way of a hostile (i.e., unsolicited) 
tender offer to its existing shareholders.  In this scenario, deployment by the board of a defensive 
tactic (e.g., a shareholder rights plan) which has the intended effect of diluting the offeror’s holding 
or otherwise reducing the attractiveness of the bid target may be entirely consistent with the share-
holder wealth maximization norm where the target company’s directors honestly and rationally 
perceive the bid, for whatever reasons, to represent inadequate value for its shareholders.  However, 
such a defensive response by the board would arguably be contrary to the trusteeship principle inso-
far as it represents an illegitimate use of the directors’ fiduciary powers for the purpose of distorting 
the company’s existing balance of voting power, and thereby usurping the existing shareholders’ 
constitutional prerogative to decide whether the price offered by the bidder is acceptable in light of 
their own personal preferences as beneficiaries of the notional corporate “trust.”  Although (at least 
to the best of the authors’ knowledge) Berle did not explicitly discuss the application of the trustee-
ship principle in the context of contests for control, the above purported application of the principle 
would appear to the authors to be justified by analogy with its closest comparative equivalent; name-
ly, the English “proper purpose” doctrine.  The latter doctrine is widely acknowledged in England to 
provide a judicial safeguard to a company’s existing democratic governance structure in the face of 
undue directorial interference, even in situations where such action would otherwise be justifiable as 
an exercise of the board’s honest and informed business judgment as to what they believe to be in 
the best interests of the shareholders.  On this, see Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd. [1967] Ch. 254; Howard 
Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] 1 All ER 1126 (P.C.) (appeal taken from the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales); J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN 
THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 137–140 (1993). 
 24. See FWCMAT, supra note 3. 
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mingly cogent evidence in support of the “Berle as shareholder wealth 
maximization advocate” hypothesis. 
A more integral analysis of Berle’s overall normative position in 
TMC establishes, however, that his trusteeship model was intended only 
as a temporary doctrinal stopgap against what he saw as the corporate 
control vacuum.  This was pending fuller and more fundamental resolu-
tion of the accountability and legitimacy problems posed by the public 
corporate form.  While advancing his shareholder-centric conceptualiza-
tion of corporate law, Berle at the same time expressed his “full realiza-
tion of the possibility that private property may one day cease to be the 
basic concept in terms of which the courts handle problems of large scale 
enterprise and that the corporate mechanism may prove the very means 
through which such modification is brought about.”25  He nevertheless 
conceded on grounds of pragmatism that “[u]ntil this modification does 
occur, . . . the lawyer is forced to think in terms of private property.”26  
Berle therefore claimed that shareholder primacy, by means of the trus-
teeship principle, was justifiable in the immediate term not only as the 
least worst solution to the problem of managerial hegemony,27 but also as 
the only logical response to the corporate accountability deficit available 
within the doctrinal machinery of the common law.  This was because of 
what he described as the common law’s “ancient preoccupation” with 
protecting the property and other private interests of individuals in their 
relationships with one another.  Thus, common law logic was ill-
equipped for setting up “ideal schemes of government” via regulation of 
managerial conduct in the interests of the public at large.28 
In any event, Berle believed that the trusteeship principle could on-
ly ever represent, at best, a partial solution to the corporate accountability 
deficit, given the inevitable judicial difficulties involved in striking an 
effective balance between: (a) preserving managerial discretion to make 
various and complex commercial decisions; and (b) mitigating the scope 
for abuse by directors and managers of their official powers and preroga-
tives at the shareholders’ expense.  Berle therefore opined that ultimate-
ly, a shareholder’s welfare remained largely dependent on “the expecta-
tion of fair dealing” by managers as opposed to any concrete and defens-
                                                 
 25. TMC, supra note 1, at 219. 
 26. Id. at 219–20. 
 27. For an analysis of managerial power as the crucial issue at the heart of TMC, see Dalia 
Tsuck Mitchell, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th Century American 
Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 194 (2005) (“The separation of ownership from con-
trol was important to the extent that it contributed to the amassing of corporate power and pointed to 
ways to tame potential excesses and abuses of corporate power.”). 
 28. TMC, supra note 1, at 296. 
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ible legal basis.29  In view of this fact, Berle made the somewhat bleak 
assessment that, even accounting for the existence of his proposed trus-
teeship model of corporate law, “the shareholder in the modern corporate 
situation has surrendered a set of definite rights for a set of indefinite 
expectations” and, in consequence, “is definitely made subservient to the 
will of a controlling group of managers.”30  This would seem to imply 
that in spite of his best efforts to this effect in TMC, Berle came to the 
pessimistic conclusion that the search for a legal principle to mitigate 
managerial hegemony vis-à-vis shareholders was an ultimately futile en-
deavor.31 
It would therefore appear that, contrary to current interpretations of 
his work, Berle did not view shareholder disempowerment and mana-
gerial hegemony as problems that were in the long-term either remedia-
ble or reversible.  On the contrary, he argued that “the reason for the 
weakening of the shareholder’s position lay as much in his inability to 
manage as in the obvious willingness of the ‘control’ to take over.”32  In 
other words, the corporate accountability deficit was due as much to the 
inevitable control failings of ineffective shareholders as it was to the ac-
quisitiveness of power-hungry managers, and the surrounding corporate 
law framework had evolved so as to adapt to this economic fact.  It was 
seemingly with this consideration in mind that Berle, in the end, la-
mented the possibility that “the bulk of American industry might soon be 
operated by trustees for the benefit of inactive and irresponsible security 
owners.”33  He nonetheless took solace in his expectation that “[w]hen a 
convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is gener-
ally accepted, in that moment the passive property right of today must 
yield before the larger interests of society.”34 
The picture that emerges of Berle from an integral reading of TMC 
is not that of a staid conservative fighting against the winds of change, 
but rather of a radical social reformist possessed with an unusually strong 
pragmatic trait.  In other words, Berle looked to mobilize significant 
reform but nevertheless acknowledged the incapacity of the available 
(legal) institutional ammunition to bring his proposed vision into imme-
diate and definite effect.  On a normative level, however, Berle’s work 
on the whole was much more concerned with exploiting the long-term 
transformative potential of the separation of ownership and control than 
                                                 
 29. Id. at 243. 
 30. Id. at 244. 
 31. On this point, see Antoine Rebérioux, Does Shareholder Primacy Lead to a Decline in 
Managerial Accountability?, 31 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 507, 513 (2007). 
 32. TMC, supra note 1, at 131. 
 33. Id. at 311. 
 34. Id. at 312. 
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mitigating the perceived adverse consequences of that phenomenon in 
the short term.35 
III.  BERLE’S OVERALL INSTITUTIONAL PROJECT 
Introduction 
The principal reason for Berle’s rejection of shareholder legal em-
powerment as a long-term solution to the corporate accountability deficit 
was the impossibility, as he saw it, of bringing about effective sharehold-
er influence over corporate affairs.  This was due in part to the doctrinal 
limitations of the common law as a reformist mechanism in the field of 
corporate law, as discussed in the previous Part.  But it was also attribut-
able, at least in equal part, to the internal autonomy of the capital alloca-
tion process within large-scale corporate enterprises. As a result of this 
process, shareholders became externalized from the corporation both as a 
continuing source of industrial finance and, in turn, a managerial-
disciplinary mechanism.  However, Berle, far from viewing this as an 
inhibition of the modern corporate structure, in contrast saw it as an op-
portunity for replacing the now redundant “invisible hand” of market 
pressures with the much more effective governance influence of an ener-
gized civil society and regulatory state.  Whilst, as we will observe, 
shareholders still had a role to play within Berle’s publicly-oriented ma-
nagerialist control framework, it was in a more limited capacity and with 
markedly fewer legal entitlements than they had previously been felt to 
merit. 
We begin this Part by highlighting Berle’s argument as to the inef-
fectiveness of external market forces as a constraint on managerial deci-
sion-making power.  Second, we discuss Berle’s view that internal (ma-
nagerial) actors were superior to external (market) actors in allocating 
corporate industrial capital.  Third, we examine how, with the diminution 
of product and capital markets as an effective constraint on managerial 
hegemony, the substitute influence of civil society pressures and the 
evolving public consensus came to fill this control vacuum.  Finally, we 
assess the continuing role and position of the shareholder within this in-
stitutional framework as perceived by Berle. 
A.  The Limitations of External Market Forces as a Constraint on Mana-
gerial Decision-Making Power 
In Power Without Property, Berle criticized “[c]lassical nineteenth-
century thinking” on the basis that it “ignored rather than avoided the 
                                                 
 35. For a fuller argument to this effect, see Moore & Rebérioux, supra note 7. 
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economic power problem,” by incorrectly considering “economic power 
as ultimately and irresistibly controlled by the force of an impersonal 
open market.”36  In constructing his institutional model of corporate go-
vernance, Berle was dismissive of the various markets which were al-
leged to exert extraneous constraints on managers’ executive discretion.  
This led Berle to the conclusion that managerial hegemony remained a 
prevalent feature of the modern corporation, even when accounting for 
the combined operation of the markets for corporate products, capital, 
and control. 
Consistent with other progressive managerialist scholars of his 
time, such as John Kenneth Galbraith,37 Berle was aware that the modern 
conditions of industrial concentration and oligopoly significantly limited 
the product market’s ability to function as a competitive disciplinary 
force.38  He did, however, acknowledge the potential of the corporate 
capital market as a competitive restraint on otherwise hegemonic mana-
gerially-controlled firms.  In particular, Berle noted in TMC that “over 
half of the recent phenomenal growth of the great corporations was 
achieved through the raising of new capital in the public markets.”39  
Berle consequently regarded the principal market-based safeguard of the 
shareholder interest to be the necessity for corporations to, from time to 
time, raise capital from the general public.  This would, in theory, com-
pel their managers to maintain favor with the investor community on an 
ongoing basis.  In this regard, Berle’s early thinking arguably bears a 
degree of similarity to his intellectual descendants versed in the “agency 
costs” school of thought, who advance the capital market as the principal 
institutional mechanism for mitigating (whether directly or indirectly)40 
the adverse incentives that managers would otherwise have to “shirk” in 
the performance of their tasks.41 
However, Berle’s initial apparent belief in the disciplinary effec-
tiveness of the capital market did not become a mainstay of his thinking.  
Although in the first (1932) edition of TMC Berle appeared to attach at 
least some degree of significance to the corporate capital market as a po-
                                                 
 36. PWP, supra note 13, at 85. 
 37. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 81–109 (1973). 
 38. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 
433, 434 (1962) (“[T]he aggregate of industry, both in size and in relative importance, has estab-
lished undoubted dominance.  Concentration within it is thus markedly more powerful relative to 
total production and in the total economic scene today than it was in 1932.”). 
 39. TMC, supra note 1, at 62. 
 40. In other words, the question is whether to mitigate adverse incentives via the direct market 
discipline of having to maintain access to low-cost capital from the investing public, or the indirect 
imperative of precluding the advances of a potential hostile takeover bidder.  For more information 
on this point, see infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 41. On this concept generally, see Fama, supra note 7. 
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tential institutional constraint on managerial hegemony, in the later 1968 
edition of the same work he was considerably less emphatic about its 
value in this regard.  In his preface to the 1968 edition, Berle reported 
empirical evidence that over sixty percent of corporate investment capital 
was generated by corporations internally from retained earnings, while 
only less than twenty percent of capital was amassed from the issuance 
of securities—most of which took the form of fixed-interest bonds as 
opposed to equities.42  Berle also disparaged his late contemporary Henry 
Manne’s (soon-to-be-influential) theory that the stock market could indi-
rectly discipline corporate managers by means of the contingent market 
for corporate control.  Manne suggested that this process would be trig-
gered in cases where managerial underperformance inspired a proxy 
fight by outsiders to gain effective control over the shareholder fran-
chise.43  In response, Berle argued that “in most really large corporations 
[proxy fights] never occur at all.”44  He further argued that in the ex-
traordinary instance where a contest for voting control of a corporation 
does occur, it is “quite obviously a sheer struggle between two tycoons 
for power,” and thus to depict it as a market-driven phenomenon 
amounts to “mere misdescription.”45 
In view of the above factors, Berle believed that by 1968, 
“[p]urchases and sales on the New York and other stock exchanges [did] 
                                                 
 42. See Adolf Berle, Property, Production and Revolution: A Preface to the Revised Edition of 
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY, at xv (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968) (1932) [hereinafter Berle, 1968 
Introduction].  See also Berle, supra note 38, at 440 (concluding that “[p]ublic utilities aside, the 
large corporations do not seek substantial capital either by floating bonds or new stock issues, save 
on very rare occasions.”). 
 43. On this, see Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110 (1965); Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 
COLUM. L. REV. 399, 410–13 (1962).  For an excellent summary and critical analysis of the 
Berle/Manne exchange generally, see Paddy Ireland, Defending the Rentier: Corporate Theory and 
the Reprivatization of the Public Company, in JOHN PARKINSON ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF THE COMPANY 141, 154–55 (2000). 
 44. Berle, supra note 38, at 439. 
 45. Id.  Berle did, however, acknowledge the existence of another staple institution of the 
agency costs paradigm of corporate governance, namely the market for managerial talent.  In Mod-
ern Functions, he accepted that corporations “compete in hiring promising graduates of business 
schools and in persuading executive vice presidents to leave the service of one corporation and enter 
another.”  Id.  Berle nonetheless regarded the corporate hiring process as being driven solely by the 
managerial community itself with no extraneous influence whatsoever from either shareholders or 
proxy fight participants.  Berle was also dismissive of any purported rationality underlying the ma-
nagerial labor market.  In PWP, he compared what he called “the catch-and-toss of the [American] 
market for personal talent” with the alternative Soviet Russian system for relative attribution of 
intra-firm rewards, and queried with all seriousness “whether the arbitrariness and injustice of a 
bureaucratic—any bureaucratic—system [of allocating relative organizational rewards to employees] 
are not greater than the accidents and irrationalities of the American market system.”  PWP, supra 
note 13, at 145. 
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not seriously affect the business operations of the companies whose 
shares [were] the subject of trading.”46 
He argued that “one effect of the corporate system has been to set 
up a parallel, circulating ‘property-wealth’ system, in which the wealth 
flows from passive wealth-holder to passive wealth-holder, without sig-
nificantly furthering the functions of capital formation, capital applica-
tion, capital use or risk bearing.”47 
It would therefore appear that by the time of his death in 1971, 
Berle had come to the opinion that the complete externalization of share-
holders from corporate governance had been substantially realized.48 
B.  The Desirability of Internal (Managerial) Over External (Market) 
Actors in Allocating Corporate Capital 
Crucially, Berle was not, in the long run, principally bothered by 
the issue of shareholder disempowerment vis-à-vis hegemonic managers.  
On the contrary, he viewed the externalization of shareholders from the 
corporate productive process as an ultimately progressive economic de-
velopment.  Whilst Berle was cognizant of the accountability deficit that 
resulted from managers’ increasing autonomy over the capital allocation 
process, he also lauded this deficit as one of the novel advantages of the 
modern corporate property-holding system.  The beneficial outcome of 
this development, according to Berle, was that the “distribution and redi-
stribution of wealth-holding [could] take place without interruption of 
the productive process”49 so that the corporation, in effect, could “run on 
its own economic steam.”50  Berle demonstrated a strong preference for 
internal over external methods of capital allocation51 for two principal 
(and overlapping) reasons.  First, Berle possessed a longstanding lack of 
faith in the informational efficiency of public stock markets.  Second, 
                                                 
 46. 1968 Introduction, supra note 42, at xxiv. 
 47. Id. at xxii.  In this regard, Berle recognized that the then-growing body of securities law 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission was not concerned with the underlying 
affairs of corporations but rather with the separate process of ensuring that buyers and sellers on 
liquid securities markets had sufficient information to make prudent decisions on the relative prices 
of shares.  Id. at xxi. 
 48. Writing in 1962, Berle even went so far as to opine (by his own admission slightly tenta-
tively) that the shareholder’s beneficial interest “has been completely, solidly, and finally severed 
from the economic and productive enterprise of the corporation whose shares form the corpus of the 
trust, on whose success, at long last, he and his fellow beneficiaries depend.”  Berle, supra note 38, 
at 448 (emphasis added). 
 49. 1968 Introduction, supra note 42, at xxiv. 
 50. Id. at xv. 
 51. In this regard, Berle emphatically claimed: “[p]robably the greatest single power inherent 
in corporate managements is their allocation of the risk capital they thus accumulate.”  Berle, supra 
note 38, at 441. 
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Berle was concerned about the social harm that could be caused by em-
powering irrational securities investors as corporate governance actors. 
As to the first of these factors, Berle’s skepticism about the ratio-
nality of securities markets is a further characteristic that distinguishes 
him from his descendants versed in the “agency costs” school of thought, 
whose reasoning is contrarily underpinned by a uniting faith in one or 
another version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH).  In 
essence, the ECMH emphasizes (in varying degrees) the purported ten-
dency of securities market prices to reflect the information that is rele-
vant to the future income-generating potential of any particular securi-
ty—which in the case of a corporate equity investment will naturally in-
clude data pertaining to the underlying performance and prospects of the 
relevant company’s business.  Most proponents of the ECMH within law 
and finance theory appear to recognize the inevitable limitations of the 
various securities market mechanisms (e.g. securities analysts, stock ex-
change disclosure rules, and investment banks’ securities underwriting 
activities) that in practice bring about the ongoing process of “data-
transfer” from the internal (corporate) to external (market) environment.  
Nonetheless, “agency costs” approaches to corporate governance are 
generally united in their preference for external (market) over internal 
(managerial) methods of capital allocation, as derived from a Hayekian 
belief in the superior computational capacity of dispersed market actors 
over concentrated organizational technocrats.52 
Needless to say, Berle did not share this belief.  In TMC, he referred 
to “the great swings in society’s appraisal of its own immediate future as 
reflected in the general level of values in the organized markets,”53—a 
critique that would be echoed in greater detail by John Maynard Keynes 
four years later in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Mon-
ey.54  Berle argued that “liquid55 property, at least under the corporate 
                                                 
 52. On the ECMH generally, see Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).  For more critical analyses of the ECMH, see ROBERT J. 
SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechan-
isms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, (2003) 28 J. CORP. L. 715 
(2003); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2002); Lynn A. 
Stout, Inefficient Markets and the New Finance, 14 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 95 (2005). 
 53. TMC, supra note 1, at 65. 
 54 . JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND 
MONEY (1936). 
 55. The characteristic of “liquidity” denotes the ease with which a commodity or investment 
can be readily transferred into cash.  Relatively small-scale corporate equity investments which are 
traded on deep regulated securities markets (such as the New York Stock Exchange) are regarded to 
be highly liquid in nature in contrast to relatively large-scale entrepreneurial, family or private equity 
investments, which tend to be viewed as highly illiquid.  The implication of this distinction for cor-
porate governance, as explained further below, is that illiquidity in a sense “fixes” the investor to the 
underlying property (e.g., the relevant company’s business), whereas liquidity facilitates an effective 
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system, obtains a set of values in exchange, represented by market prices, 
which are not immediately dependent upon, or at least only obliquely 
connected with, the underlying values of the properties themselves.”56  
Berle’s skepticism as to the reliability of stock market pricing appears to 
be much more severe in his later writing.  In AER, for instance, he ob-
served how “[v]aguely, moving from one inexact calculation to another, 
the market arrives at a purely romantic estimate of what a share of Gen-
eral Motors or General Electric is worth.”57 
This leads to Berle’s second, and arguably more serious, concern 
about the adverse influence of external capital markets on corporate go-
vernance.  Similarly to Keynes, Berle’s principal concern with securities 
markets was not so much that investors lacked the relevant information 
required to make rational decisions in their own interests, but rather that 
they possessed the wrong kind of incentives to make decisions that would 
further the productivity and effectiveness of the corporations in which 
they were invested.  Therefore, rather than regarding shareholders as be-
ing the “victims” of managerial prerogative in any meaningful sense, 
Berle was, on the whole, much more concerned about the potential harm 
that shareholders, if institutionally empowered, could cause to the corpo-
ration by virtue of the peculiar incentives and considerations underlying 
their investment decisions. 
Berle claimed that estimations of share value are typically based not 
on entrepreneurial predictions of advances in “economic operation,” but 
merely on likely future changes in the value of those shares themselves 
(echoing Keynes’ famous “prettiest face competition” metaphor from his 
General Theory).58  Both Keynes and Berle contrasted the transient and 
fleeting quality of financial capital (liquidity) with the more entrenched 
and durable nature of corporate industrial capital.  Keynes believed that 
“[d]ecisions to invest in private business of the old-fashioned [entrepre-
neurial] type were . . . largely irrevocable, not only for the community as 
a whole, but also for the individual.”59  However, 
[w]ith the separation between ownership and management which 
prevails to-day and with the development of organised investment 
markets, a new factor of great importance has entered in . . . [insofar 
as] the Stock Exchange revalues many investments every day and 
the revaluations give a frequent opportunity to the individual 
                                                                                                             
divorce between the investor and underlying property by rendering the investor dependent principal-
ly on the investment’s external market-realization value, rather than internal yield value, in order to 
secure an effective rate of return on it.  On this, see AER, supra note 14, at 25. 
 56. TMC, supra note 1, at 250. 
 57. AER, supra note 14, at 32. 
 58. 1968 Introduction, supra note 42, at xxiii. 
 59. KEYNES, supra note 54, at 150. 
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(though not to the community as a whole) to revise his commit-
ments.60 
Berle and Keynes recognized that the vast majority of stock ex-
change transactions involved the mere transfer of historical investments 
in companies that had long since fulfilled their industrial purpose.  How-
ever, both writers acknowledged that the price of a company’s securities 
on the secondary trading market could potentially affect that company’s 
capacity to raise funds on the primary capital market by determining the 
acceptable price of any future public offering.  It followed that, so long 
as companies were dependent at least to some extent on the external 
capital market as a continuing source of finance, there was a correspond-
ing risk that the skewed incentives and horizons of securities investors 
would have a detrimental effect on industrial capital allocation.  While 
Berle’s belief that the passivity of the American shareholder populace 
precluded the need for direct examination of the potential evils of exces-
sive shareholder influence over corporate capital allocation, Keynes (re-
ferring to the less managerially-intensive British corporate governance 
system) was aware of the adverse effect on national investment and 
productivity that resulted “[w]hen the capital development of a country 
becomes the by-product of the activities of a casino.”61 
Berle’s recognition of the potentially detrimental implications of 
involving securities market actors in industrial capital decisions led him 
to embrace the shareholder’s externalization from corporate control as an 
overall progressive social development.  In Berle’s view, it was this phe-
nomenon more than any other that enabled the condition of capital li-
quidity to persist in tandem with the continuing productive demands of 
the business enterprise.  In this way, both industrial corporations and se-
curities markets can most effectively fulfill their respective social objec-
tives (crudely speaking, industrial productivity and financial accumula-
tion) in general autonomy from one another, irrespective of the underly-
ing link between these two institutions represented by the phenomenon 
of liquid corporate equity. 
In conclusion, therefore, Berle felt that the externalization of share-
holders from corporate financing and governance was a socially desira-
ble phenomenon that should ultimately be encouraged.  Berle preferred 
capital allocation to be determined by autonomous managers using inter-
nal capital reserves and situated within the corporate organization itself.  
This was because, in Berle’s view, expert corporate managers were con-
siderably better situated and equipped than external securities market 
                                                 
 60. Id. at 150–51. 
 61. Id. at 159. 
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actors to determine the appropriate rate and direction of industrial devel-
opment. 
C.  Civil Society and the Public Consensus as an Informal Check on 
Managerial Decision-Making Power 
Berle’s emphatic defense of managerial autonomy from external 
market influences did not, however, blind him from the significant ac-
countability problems that such autonomy posed.  In TMC, Berle warned 
of the potential power reach of the “new princes” of industry62 that the 
public corporate form had created.  Berle, more than anyone, was aware 
of the disastrous socio-political consequences that could follow from the 
exercise of untrammeled managerial discretion.  Berle observed how, as 
a “social organization,” the modern corporation “involves a concentra-
tion of power in the economic field comparable to the concentration of 
religious power in the mediaeval church or of political power in the na-
tional state.”63  On this basis, he surmised that “more could be learned 
regarding [corporate controllers] by studying the motives of an Alexan-
der the Great, seeking new worlds to conquer, than by considering the 
motives of a petty tradesman of the days of Adam Smith.”64 
At the same time, Berle observed the fact that throughout history 
“[a] constant warfare has existed between the individuals wielding pow-
er, in whatever form, and the subjects of that power,” and that “[j]ust as 
there is a continuous desire for power, so also there is a continuous desire 
to make that power the servant of the bulk of the individuals it affects.”65  
In particular, Berle observed within contemporary American society an 
“insistence that power in economic organization shall be subjected to the 
same tests of public benefit which have been applied in their turn to 
power otherwise located,”66 and argued that “[w]hen a convincing sys-
tem of community obligations is worked out and is generally accepted, in 
that moment the passive property right of today must yield before the 
larger interests of society.”67  On this basis, Berle predicted a future 
where corporate law assumes the status of “a potential constitutional law 
for the new economic state,” with business practice in its turn “increa-
singly assuming the aspect of economic statesmanship.”68  Berle envi-
saged the corporate managerial sector ultimately assuming the status of 
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 63. Id. at 309. 
 64. Id. at 307–08. 
 65. Id. at 310. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 312. 
 68. Id. at 313. 
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“a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various 
groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income 
stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.”69 
There is an inclination amongst scholars to regard these radical 
propositions forwarded by Berle in the final chapter of TMC as an excep-
tional feature of the book—the product of misty-eyed political optimism 
as contrasted with Berle’s sober and hard-nosed doctrinal legal scholar-
ship70 in the work’s previous chapters.  It tends to follow that, from this 
view, the normative arguments of TMC’s closing chapter are most ap-
propriately regarded as an ideological anomaly of the work—a hopeful 
but, sadly, forever incomplete project to institutionalize, via legal means, 
a truly pluralist (or at least non-proprietary) system for allocating corpo-
rate residual wealth within society.  Once the “unsuccessful” normative 
aspect of Berle’s work is cast aside in this way, readers can focus on the 
more “successful” positive aspects of received Berleian theory that are 
indeed borne out by the succeeding course of historical events, such as 
the separation of ownership and control and remedial shareholder wealth 
maximization norm.  Such a conclusion is understandable if one regards 
TMC’s normative legacy as being purely about the reform of doctrinal 
corporate law.  However, if one instead regards TMC as part of a wider 
inquiry by Berle into the multifarious civil society pressures acting on 
corporate managers, including but not restricted to the formal law, the 
book’s normative propositions acquire a more constructive and lasting 
significance for social scientists. 
Indeed, the essential idea advanced by Berle in TMC’s concluding 
chapter, in which corporate power is ultimately accountable to an exter-
nal and dynamic body of public opinion, was by no means left at the in-
tellectual wayside by Berle following completion of this seminal text.  
On the contrary, it became a core and coordinating influence of much of 
Berle’s future thinking on corporate governance—most notably in his 
classic 1959 work Power Without Property.71 
It was here that Berle developed his theory of the “public consen-
sus,” which he defined as “the existence of a set of ideas, widely held by 
the community, and often by the organization itself and the men who 
direct it, that certain uses of power are ‘wrong,’ that is, contrary to the 
established interest and value system of the community.”72  A key com-
ponent of Berle’s “public consensus” theory was the idea that individual 
citizens, while having been largely externalized from the corporate deci-
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sion-making process in their economic capacity as shareholders, had 
nevertheless at the same time acquired an increasing degree of influence 
over corporate affairs in their political capacity as engaged civil society 
actors.73  In a profoundly optimistic passage of PWP, Berle opined that: 
In terms of industrial property, the system has unquestionably re-
duced most owners to a passive-receptive role.  But in terms of 
choice of life and choice of political expression, the citizen of the 
American economic republic probably has as effective a means of 
control as individuals have ever achieved in a large country.74 
Berle explained that the public consensus is the body of “general, 
unstated premises”75  that provides a basis for the ongoing and often 
spontaneous process of public opinion formation in respect to any con-
troversial social issue.  Although the public consensus itself is unwritten 
and unsystematic, it can be elicited by reference to (inter alia) “the con-
clusions of careful university professors, the reasoned opinions of spe-
cialists, the statements of responsible journalists, and at times the solid 
pronouncements of respected politicians.”76  Moreover, while the public 
consensus contains reference to settled rules of law, “it also includes ca-
pacity to criticize that law” and “to insist that principles heretofore com-
prised only within the consensus must be added to statute or common 
law, enforceable by courts as well as by public opinion.”77 
Berle argued that, in the first place, the public consensus was effec-
tively “enforced” on managers by means of the “corporate conscience,” 
which was represented by managers’ own internal appreciation of the 
external public consensus.78  It followed that breach of the public con-
sensus would lead to “loss of prestige, public standing, and popular es-
teem for the men in the organization itself as loyalty to it is under-
mined.”79  In the event that these informal sanctions failed to produce the 
desired changes in managerial conduct, more coercive sanctions were 
likely to follow in the form of interventionist regulation by the political 
state.80  In this regard, Berle claimed that “[h]owever powerless any indi-
vidual may be to deal with economic organization on the economic 
plane, he does have, in the American democracy, a solid and respected 
power in the political field.”81  Berle believed that “[i]f enough individu-
                                                 
 73. See id. at 117. 
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als consider that they are aggrieved, they can energize a political inter-
vention,” and that “[i]n American society, the ultimate limitation on eco-
nomic power is the possibility of energizing, in any one of various ways, 
the political power of the government.”82  Consequently, political inter-
vention by the state in the event of violation of the public consensus was, 
in Berle’s view, a “near-certainty.”83  Berle further claimed that the pub-
lic consensus, although inchoate, is nevertheless “a continuously existent 
force, capable of becoming active and specific, because in a democratic 
system it can energize action by the State.”84 
Although Berle did not explicitly discuss exactly what the Ameri-
can public consensus demanded of any specific type of corporation, he 
did make one important observation concerning the way in which the 
legitimacy of corporate power is judged by the general public.  Berle 
claimed that “[p]ower (aside from its crude or brute form) cannot exist 
apart from some idea or principle justifying it and, therefore, entitling 
holders of it to expect allegiance and cooperation.”85  According to this 
logic, “[e]conomic power is justified chiefly by the fact that it is needed 
to produce, supply, and distribute goods and services, and to set up at-
tendant conditions of employment and service appropriate to these 
ends.”86  Berle argued that “[s]o long as an economic organization, Stat-
ist or non-Statist, acquires and uses its power to perform this function, it 
holds and is using the tool for the purpose which justifies its existence.”87 
Berle referred to the tendency of corporate activity to acquire a 
“functional definition” by assuming a social obligation to fulfill a partic-
ular economic task.88  By this process, “the American consumer accepts 
enterprise in corporate form as a way of getting its economic decrees 
fulfilled.”89  In turn, the prevailing public expectation as to the corpora-
tion’s proper socio-economic function is internalized by managers them-
selves, such that they “come to recognize (perhaps as ‘business states-
men’) that first claim on accumulated profits is the claim of the enter-
prise itself,” and that the perceived needs of the community in respect of 
the firm’s continuing productive operations “take precedence over the 
dividend desires of any body of passive stockholders.”90 
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The reliance placed on any corporation by the community also 
tends to increase in direct relation to its size—to the extent that it com-
mands a sufficiently large share of its market so as to become essential to 
the community.91  At that point, deprivation of supply or any other mi-
suse by the corporation of its market position (e.g. functionally unneces-
sary or socially unacceptable price rises) will be sanctioned in effect by 
the state, which will assume responsibility for providing the relevant ser-
vice in place of the exploitative corporation.92  This was particularly so 
where a corporation used its market power to increase prices to socially 
excessive levels by deliberately restricting supply of a good or service 
below the estimated level of demand for it; this, in Berle’s view, would 
amount to a breach of the “powerful tenet in the public consensus that 
the great corporations on which the American community relies for 
supply must meet the demand.”93 
The dual effect of Berle’s managerial autonomy and public consen-
sus theories was the removal of the corporate decision-making process, 
to a significant extent, from the control of extraneous (product and capi-
tal) market forces, which were eventually replaced by endogenous public 
and political pressures.  In Berle’s view, these latter pressures were at the 
very least as stringent a constraint on managerial decision-making as the 
former type, and were considerably better suited than the former type to 
the bureaucratic and quasi-public nature of modern large-scale corporate 
organizations. 
It should be pointed out that Berle, in PWP, did not advocate the 
complete usurpation of the market with politically-driven controls in the 
sense of a communistic “socialization” of industrial production and capi-
tal allocation; on the contrary, he went to great lengths in the book’s final 
chapter to highlight the differences between his perceived view of the 
American system of corporate financing and governance and its Soviet 
Russian counterpart.  Berle’s considerably more modest aim in PWP was 
to highlight what he saw as an already prominent aspect of the essentially 
market-based, capitalistic, American corporate governance system of the 
mid-twentieth century, and also to explain and normatively rationalize 
the key institutional features of this phenomenon.  What Berle envisaged 
was a rich dual framework of endogenous market and civil society con-
straints on managerial decision-making power in public companies, with 
the inevitable gaps in the former type of control being “plugged” by the 
latter, and vice versa. 
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In essence, then, Berle emphasized that an autonomous, manage-
rially-centric system of corporate financing and governance need not en-
tail the loss of executive accountability.  On the contrary, Berle’s public 
consensus theory demonstrated that publicly-driven civil society pres-
sures could in effect take the place of privately-driven market pressures 
in enforcing functionally effective managerial decision-making within 
business organizations of a certain scale and level of influence within 
society. 
D.  Shareholder Democracy as a Socially Instrumental Institution 
The diminution of proprietary control and corresponding “publici-
zation” of private sector governance within Berle’s institutional model 
posed an important question concerning the rightful position of the 
shareholder in relation to the modern corporation.  To what extent, if 
any, did Berle consider the legal empowerment of shareholders to be an 
institutional precondition for the effective functioning of his envisaged 
corporate control framework? 
Certainly, Berle’s belief in the inherent irrationality of securities 
market actors would almost certainly have rendered him hostile to the 
contemporary “shareholder primacy” argument, which asserts that share-
holders should enjoy powers of initiation and/or intervention in respect 
of aspects of core corporate decision-making (for example, in relation to 
constitutional design and major restructuring decisions) conventionally 
reserved by U.S. corporate law to the board of directors.94  Moreover, 
Berle’s lack of faith in the prospects for effective shareholder gover-
nance, and the acknowledged limitations of his purported common law 
trusteeship principle, means that it is difficult to conceive of him placing 
any more than temporary reliance on the fiduciary shareholder wealth 
maximization95 norm as an effective regulatory counterweight to mana-
gerial hegemony within large-scale corporations. 
Academic arguments for legal empowerment of shareholders today, 
whether of the more “strong-form” shareholder primacy or “semi-strong-
form” shareholder wealth maximization variety, tend to derive from a 
contractarian frame of reference, which focuses on the alleged instru-
mental value of shareholding as a distinct function within the business 
firm.  According to this logic, the shareholder offers his residual risk-
bearing function to the firm, which he is uniquely equipped to perform in 
view of the exceptional degree of “risk-hedging” facilitated by the liquid-
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ity of his investment.  In return for exclusively fulfilling this function, the 
shareholder is said to “bargain for” correspondingly exclusive residual 
profit and voting rights vis-à-vis the firm’s management.96 
But Berle never ascribed to the “shareholder as risk-taker” adage.  
In AER, he argued that: 
The rewards or losses derived from [passive property] bear no nec-
essary relation (if any) to work done, or risk taken, or the usefulness 
of the aggregated property.  None of the old answers suffice.  Both 
the original moral base (reward for capacity and thrift) and the 
original pragmatic function (need for individual skill in applying 
capital) have pretty well disappeared.97 
Likewise, in TMC, Berle described how, with the development of 
the modern public corporation, the two productive functions traditionally 
ascribed to entrepreneurial activity, namely risking of wealth and appli-
cation of skill, had become separated from one another and vested in 
shareholders and management respectively.  On this basis, Berle claimed 
that there was no longer an economic justification for awarding share-
holders corporate profits beyond the “fair return to capital” that is suffi-
cient to induce them to continue risking their wealth in corporate equity.  
To award profits to shareholders beyond this threshold served no useful 
purpose insofar as shareholders could not be encouraged to apply a 
greater degree of skill or effort to business affairs given their complete 
non-involvement in the corporate-managerial process. 98   In the same 
work, Berle compared the position of the modern day shareholder to that 
of a bondholder or lender of money, and argued that the distinction that 
had hitherto been drawn between these two types of investors was now 
of little value.  Like a bondholder, an equity holder in effect had an ex-
pectation of receiving “interest” in the form of periodic dividends, fol-
lowed by repayment of the “principal” via resale of his holding on a liq-
uid marketplace.99 
In any event, Berle placed little faith in the shareholder franchise as 
a potential influence vis-à-vis managers, noting that “the usual stock-
holder has little power over the affairs of the enterprise, and his vote, if 
he has one, is rarely capable of being used as an instrument of democrat-
                                                 
 96. On this, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
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ic control.”100  Further, he observed how “[a]s the number of stockhold-
ers increases, the capacity of each to express opinions is extremely li-
mited” with the effect that “[n]o one is bound to take notice of them.”101  
Seemingly with these considerations in mind, Berle pondered in PWP 
whether: 
If we were building the American economic system anew, we might 
wonder whether the present system of stockholders’ votes was the 
best way, or even a good way, of choosing managers or of locating 
power.  It continues chiefly because no one has come up with a bet-
ter scheme.102 
Berle defended the institution of self-selecting boards as being in-
evitable on the basis that external stockholders lacked the knowledge to 
elect representatives with sufficient and relevant technical acumen to 
deal with the complex problems typically faced by modern business cor-
porations.  In a passage that would no doubt provoke the ire of many 
present-day shareholder rights lobbyists, Berle insisted that: 
[u]ntil the community on the one hand or the ritualistic stockholders 
on the other develop far more inclination and capacity for under-
standing difficult problems and reaching wise personnel decisions, 
economic power perhaps is best located in a sort of government of 
best minds, ultimately responsible to a community consensus which 
sets up general objectives, standards of performance, and results.103 
Berle’s antipathy towards the shareholder empowerment agenda did 
not, however, result in the complete elimination of the shareholder from 
his institutional vision.  Rather, Berle continued to recognize the impor-
tance of shareholding as a politico-economic institution within modern 
American capitalist society.  On this basis he advanced a novel and con-
sidered defense of the shareholder protectorate agenda, albeit in a rela-
tively limited form (i.e., as entailing only a residual dual entitlement to 
voting and profit-taking without any further rights of intervention or in-
fluence in respect of corporate decision-making).  In other words, Berle 
ultimately defended shareholder democracy104 in its barest form, whilst 
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rejecting any more extensive alternative methods for the legal empo-
werment of shareholders in corporate governance. 
Berle’s defense of shareholder democracy on politico-economic 
grounds consisted of two main “sub-defenses”: (1) a defense of the insti-
tution of shareholder voting (the political dimension of shareholder de-
mocracy); and (2) a defense of the shareholder’s entitlement to receive 
dividends (the economic dimension of shareholder democracy). 
1.  Berle’s Defense of the Shareholder’s Right to Vote 
(The Political Dimension) 
Berle presented the notion of shareholder democracy principally on 
the basis of its ideological implications for the wider political economy 
in which corporations operated.  A significant factor underlying Berle’s 
continuing support for shareholder democracy was his apparent belief 
that the progressive diminution of the shareholder’s proprietary econom-
ic influence over corporate affairs varied inversely with the shareholder’s 
growing political influence as a general civil society actor. According to 
Berle: 
The former property owner, as he loses his importance in carrying 
on economic initiative, is increasingly becoming important as a 
consumer and as a political factor through his opinions and through 
his vote.105 
Berle explained that, in this latter capacity, a shareholder’s opinions 
“may have quasi-political importance, similar to that of constituents who 
write letters to their congressman.”106  On this basis, Berle presented the 
seemingly archaic and outmoded institution of the annual corporate 
shareholders’ meeting in a novel and progressive light, by seeing it as a 
formal ceremonial fulcrum around which the process of public and po-
litical consensus formation could develop.  Berle argued that “though 
methods of locating power and choosing its holders may have become 
obsolete by rational standards, they nevertheless work remarkably 
well.” 107   This was, in Berle’s opinion, attributable to the fact that 
“[c]ommunity consensus has established minimum standards of capacity 
and acceptability for the holders of such power,” which “are generally 
taken into account by the people who operate the processes and rituals of 
selection.”108  According to this process, “a mandate, derived from obso-
lete processes of selection, will continue to be satisfactory for long pe-
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riods of time if the men selected are acceptable by community stan-
dards.”109  In turn, Berle claimed, “[d]irectors of corporations whose con-
trol is held by the ‘public’ (that is to say, by a great number of scattered 
shareholders) probably pay greater attention to the unwritten, uncrystal-
lized, but very real standards set up by the public consensus than do the 
holders of undisputed control.”110 
In essence, Berle’s corporate governance vision could be said to 
comprise centralized and autonomous managerial decision-making 
power “checked” extraneously by a dynamic and largely informal body 
of public and political opinion vis-à-vis corporate affairs.  Within this 
model, the corporate shareholders’ meeting retains limited functional 
value as a formal institutional conduit for articulation and expression of 
the multi-faceted and often inchoate public consensus within economic 
society.  Shareholders, meanwhile, acquire a powerful dual significance 
in their capacity as simultaneous economic and political participants in 
the governance process. 
2.  Berle’s Defence of the Shareholder’s Right to Receive Dividends 
(The Economic Dimension) 
As well as arguing for preservation of the shareholder’s voting en-
titlement, Berle also at notable points in his work provided very convinc-
ing normative support for the shareholder’s traditional right to receive 
dividends.  In view of Berle’s rejection of the notion that shareholders 
fulfilled any meaningful risk-taking function within the modern corpora-
tion, his defense of their entitlement to a periodic share of corporate prof-
its (traditionally regarded as the “reward” for entrepreneurial risk-taking) 
might initially appear surprising. 
Crucially, however, Berle defended the shareholder’s dividend right 
principally on welfarist grounds as an institutional precondition for the 
extensive provision of social security via private sector means.  In his 
1932 exchange with Dodd, Berle highlighted the fact that in the United 
States, public corporations had become crucial not just as significant em-
ployers and suppliers of goods and services, but also as the primary me-
dium for generating (through stock market returns) sustainable income 
streams to fund socially essential financial services.  Berle recorded that 
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by 1932, over half of the U.S. population was either directly or indirectly 
dependent on corporate securities (whether held personally or institution-
ally) for the purpose of social security provision.111  For this reason he 
believed that, with the abandonment of the shareholder protectorate 
agenda in its entirety, “it becomes necessary to present a system (none 
has been presented) of law or government, or both, by which responsibil-
ity for control of national wealth and income is so apportioned and en-
forced that the community as a whole, or at least the great bulk of it, is 
properly taken care of.”112  Thus, corporate equities remained of socio-
economic value within Berle’s thinking primarily as aspects of financial 
property in their own right.  Accordingly, the principle of shareholder 
democracy retained significance insofar as profit-taking and voting rights 
that attach to corporate equities formed the basis of their identity and 
value as tradable financial commodities; in this capacity, they formed a 
centrifugal element of the United States’ property-based welfare system. 
Berle recognized, however, that the capacity of the shareholder de-
mocracy principle to command widespread legitimacy within American 
society as a contributor to the country’s welfare system depended on 
whether, as a matter of fact, the great bulk of its population was satisfac-
torily provided for via returns from public corporate equity.113  To this 
end, Berle noted in his later work that, over the course of the four dec-
ades following his exchange with Dodd, corporate equity holding had 
spread exponentially across American society to the extent that, by 1968, 
shares had become by far the most popular form of personal wealth-
holding in the United States.  Berle observed that between 1929 and 
1967, the number of shareholders in the U.S. had increased from around 
1 million to between 22 and 23 million. 
Berle further argued that the shareholder’s residual entitlement to 
corporate dividends was justifiable on politico-economic grounds as a 
means towards ensuring a sufficient distribution of wealth in American 
society so as to enable widespread self-reliance and self-realization.114  
Indeed, in TMC, Berle went so far as to query whether the increased dis-
persal of industrial ownership—made possible by the modern corpora-
tion—represented “a permanent change in the ownership of industrial 
wealth comparable to the shift in land ownership which was an outward 
growth of the French Revolution.”115  And, although Berle acknowledged 
that under the system of private security ownership “certain individuals 
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may perhaps acquire a disproportionate share of wealth,” he nevertheless 
regarded this as “an incident to the system and not its major premise.”  
He opined that “statistically, it plays a relatively minor part.”116  In this 
context, shareholder entitlement to dividends was (somewhat ironically 
from a present day ideological standpoint) advanced by Berle as “a ve-
hicle for rationalized wealth distribution corresponding to and serving 
the American ideal of a just civilization,”117 and as an alternative redi-
stributive mechanism to more rigid and statist measures, such as a na-
tional minimum wage or “governmentally assured minimum income.”118  
Just like the associated welfarist justification advanced by Berle for the 
shareholder’s right to dividends, however, Berle’s wider economic-
distributive argument for the phenomenon was contingent on the actual 
realization of the distributive process across the vast majority of the 
community, to the extent that “every American family has its fragment of 
that position and of the wealth by which the opportunity to develop indi-
viduality becomes fully actualized.”119 
IV.  CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF BERLE’S THEORY FOR 
CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATES 
The core point that we try to make in this article is that by studying 
Berle’s thinking on corporate governance in an integral and contextual 
way, it is possible to deduce a consistent ideological thread running 
throughout his lifetime scholarship.  That uniting thread transcends the 
many apparent ambiguities and inconsistencies that are prone to appear 
on the basis of more particularized readings of Berle’s work.  In particu-
lar, it is our belief that the three underlying and overlapping central 
themes of the Berleian corporate governance project—namely manageri-
al autonomy, civil society oversight, and shareholder democracy as a 
socially instrumental institution—are together capable of representing a 
coordinating nexus around which Berle’s work can be consistently un-
derstood. 
We hope that this finding will contribute to the ongoing academic 
debate on corporate governance, both in the United States and beyond, in 
at least two important respects: (1) the role that might be played by the 
state in corporate governance; and (2) the nature of the relationship be-
tween shareholders and the corporation. 
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A.  Corporate Governance and the State 
It is widely acknowledged that the last three decades of the twen-
tieth century represented something of a revolutionary period in the de-
velopment of academic thinking on corporate governance in the United 
States.  In particular, this era witnessed a progressive growth in the influ-
ence of economic logic within corporate governance scholarship, which 
resulted in the widespread application by scholars of market-based incen-
tive and disciplinary mechanisms as perceived institutional solutions to 
the corporate accountability deficit.  A common theme underlying many 
such “agency costs” approaches to the corporate governance problem 
was a uniting faith in the informational efficiency of primary and sec-
ondary corporate capital markets, and the resultant credibility of the 
stock price mechanism as an effective “score card” of managerial per-
formance and the comparative robustness of firm-level governance sys-
tems.  An implicit normative outcome of such analyses is the conceptual 
interfusion of corporate “efficiency”—understood in the narrow sense of 
managerial responsiveness to stock market signals—with the dual tenets 
of “accountability” and “legitimacy” in the wider socio-political sense.  
In other words, corporations that are compliant with the dictates of exter-
nal capital market actors (e.g., institutional shareholders, analysts, ratings 
agencies, and independent directors) are deemed to be accountable com-
panies.  This suggests, in turn, that the possession and exercise of mana-
gerial decision-making power within these firms is socially legitimate.120 
By this course of logic, the continuing social problem of managerial 
power and the need for its public legitimization within democratic civil 
society is conveniently elided by reference to the capital market as an 
accountability mechanism.  In particular, the contractarian frame of ref-
erence from which “agency costs” analyses derive is built on the implicit 
understanding that market-driven pressures and rules are ultimately ca-
pable of limiting the decision-making power of corporate managers to 
socially unproblematic levels. 
Admittedly, some contractarian theorists recognize the inherent li-
mitations of pure market-driven pressures and governance structures as 
an effective constraint on managerial hegemony, and consequently ac-
cept the inevitability of mandatory corporate governance rules as set 
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down rigidly by the state.121  However, even in these more interventionist 
contractarian analyses, the basic normative premise remains that the 
state’s legitimate role should ultimately be restricted to facilitating the 
“neutral,” market-driven, private ordering process as opposed to super-
seding it in any way through politically-motivated regulatory meas-
ures.122  The problem with such a de-politicized conception of the regula-
tory state’s role in corporate governance, however, is that it refuses to 
consider the possibility identified by Berle that public civil society pres-
sures might act as an effective proxy for the inevitable limitations of pri-
vate market measures as a constraint on managerial decision-making 
power.  By assuming that politically-driven rules in corporate gover-
nance are a priori illegitimate, and correspondingly that market-driven or 
market-facilitative governance rules (whether reversible or mandatory in 
form) are in themselves capable of constraining managerial power to so-
cially unproblematic levels, contractarian logic in effect reasons away the 
inevitable residual decision-making power wielded by senior corporate 
officers.  It therefore fails to confront the possibility (implicit in Berle’s 
analysis in PWP) that a dual framework of market and political drivers of 
corporate governance reform—with the latter ultimately subject to the 
proper constitutional checks and balances of a liberal democracy—might 
provide a more effective and legitimate system of constraints on mana-
gerial power than market-based pressures acting alone. 
One further related implication of Berle’s thinking is the undermin-
ing of the orthodox characterization of politically-motivated corporate 
governance norms as being necessarily rigid, regulatory, and bureaucrat-
ic.  This is in contrast to market-driven norms, which by virtue of the 
implicit private ordering process can be more flexible, informal, and fac-
tually tailored in nature.123  However, in PWP, Berle identified that the 
inchoate public consensus can fulfill an indirect role comparable to that 
of stock market pressures within today’s corporate governance system.  
In other words, it can provide informal pre-regulatory pressures for go-
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vernance reform which, in turn, motivate endogenous, corporate, institu-
tional design by boards as a preemptive response to potential statist regu-
latory measures.124  In this way, politicized civil society pressures can be 
given license to fulfill a structurally similar disciplinary function to that 
performed by “neutral” stock market pressures within the contractarian 
governance paradigm whilst, at the same time, recognizing the continu-
ing (albeit inevitably limited) role of the latter type of pressure as a ma-
nagerial accountability mechanism.  The resultant picture that emerges is 
of a rich dual framework of economic and political drivers of endogen-
ous corporate norm evolution at the individual firm level, reinforced in 
the last place by a sophisticated multi-partite regulatory system that is 
responsive to both market and civil society pressures for facilitative regu-
latory intervention. 
B.  Corporate Governance and Shareholders 
The second, and more radical, outcome that follows from Berle’s 
overall position concerns the continuing normative validity of the share-
holder’s relatively privileged position within the corporate governance 
hierarchy.  In Part III.C.2, we emphasized that, within Berle’s vision, the 
continuing legitimacy of the notion of shareholder democracy (in both a 
legal and wider social sense) was contingent on the ideal of an American 
shareholding democracy being practically realized in the near future.  
Berle predicted that, as a result, beneficial corporate ownership together 
with the associated economic benefits would come to be spread diffusely 
across a sizeable proportion of the country’s population.  Whether this is 
indeed the case today is a subject of potentially fierce empirical and in-
terpretative debate beyond the scope of this article.  Certainly, however, 
it is doubtful whether the American shareholder populace in 2010 can be 
regarded as a sufficiently representative cross-sector of the U.S. citizenry 
to permit the politico-economic justification of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm on grounds of effective social security provision or 
widespread individual self-realization alone. 
Moreover, if it is the case today that the annual shareholder meeting 
is not regarded as sufficiently pluralist in form to elicit the wider indirect 
engagement of the general public in corporate governance affairs, it fol-
lows that the institution of shareholder suffrage is no longer (if indeed it 
ever was) capable of representing an appropriate formal fulcrum for pub-
lic consensus formation.  If so, then it may reasonably be questioned 
whether the public consensus vis-à-vis corporate affairs would be more 
                                                 
 124. On the significance of private, pre-regulatory rule-making by boards in response to ortho-
dox economic pressure from shareholders, see Bebchuk, supra note 94, at 869–70. 
2010] Corporate Power in the Public Eye 1139 
effectively and legitimately mobilized around an additional or alternative 
institutional nexus that provides a more inclusive quasi-democratic re-
presentation of the public interest in large-scale economic organization.  
A possible starting point for further inquiry in this regard would be re-
consideration of whether there is a legitimate role for worker involve-
ment in corporate governance as a potential proxy for comprehensive 
civil society engagement in the shareholder franchise.  Additionally, or 
alternatively, there is a potential normative case for corporatist state par-
ticipation in governance processes at an individual firm or industry level, 
perhaps in conjunction with the federal government’s recognized role 
today as ultimate economic risk-bearer in enterprises of core social signi-
ficance and impact, such as in the banking and automobile manufactur-
ing sectors. 
In any event, the underlying point is that with the rejection of stock 
market responsiveness as an exhaustive criterion of managerial accoun-
tability in itself, there arises the corresponding necessity to acknowledge 
potential additional institutional mechanisms for achieving the social 
legitimacy of corporate decision-making power.  If the solutions that this 
inquiry encourages appear radical in nature, it only signifies the extent of 
the corporate accountability deficit and the resultant importance of ensur-
ing its effective resolution within contemporary economic society. 
 
